





















































The standard account of the micro-structure of time is 
based on Cantor’s conception of continuity and thus 
views the time line as consisting of undenumerably 
many instants ordered by the B-theoretic earlier than 
relation. This may seem problematic for an A-theory 
of time such as presentism, according to which only 
what is present exists, for it seems to leave no room 
for the instants of a Cantorean time line. This paper 
defends a version of presentism that can accommo-
date the Cantorean conception and more generally 
any approach to the micro-structure of time based on 
durationless instants.
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Presentism is an A-theory of time, according to which only present things exist. It 
is very much debated nowadays and has many supporters, although it is probably a 
minority view, since the B-theory of time, or B-eternalism, appears to enjoy a larg-
er consensus. Indeed, much of the literature on presentism involves criticisms of it 
by B-theorists, or even by non-presentist A-theorists, such as A-eternalists or grow-
ing block theorists. As a matter of fact, despite its commonsensical appeal, there are 
many serious difficulties that presentism must confront. Most notoriously, the truth-
maker problem and the problem of cross-temporal relations. However, I shall not deal 
with them here (for my take on them, see Orilia 2016).
I shall rather focus on a further problem for presentism, which, with ref-
erence to the Cantorean account of the continuity of time, has been raised as fol-
lows in the call for papers for this issue of Philosophy kitchen (consulted on April 
6, 2020):
It is important to underline that the Cantorean account was originally construed to formalize 
certain properties of the continuum of space. This leaves open the question whether such an 
account can be applied to temporal case. Is the time-continuum to be thought as an actual 
(uncountable) infinity of instants? In the contemporary debates about time in analytic meta-
physics, the Cantorean account of the continuum is often presupposed. This raises a series of 
questions. It is not clear how this understanding could be compatible with Presentism. Insofar 
as it presupposes an actual infinite of distinct temporal points, the Cantorean continuum 
seems to imply commitment to Eternalism. Moreover, the Cantorean model gives priority to 
the temporal order based on the relation “earlier than”. Hence, the challenge of integrating this 
model holds for any theory which considers temporal passage to be more fundamental than 
temporal relations (A-Theory). These problems raise a fundamental issue: that of reconciling 
the continuous nature of time with its dynamic. How can time be conceived simultaneously 
as something continuous, hence extensive, and passing?
I shall argue that presentism, or at least an appropriate version of presentism, sub-
stantivalist presentism, can successfully address these problems, and thus be con-
sidered compatible with Cantor’s account of the continuum, as applied to time. More 
generally, I shall argue that a presentism of this sort is compatible not only with the 
Cantorean conception, but with what I would like to call instantism. By this I mean a 
general standpoint regarding, in the terminology of Newton-Smith (1980, ch. 6), the 
micro-structure of time, which, like the Cantorean conception, admits durationless 
instants as fundamental. The opposite general standpoint, according to which dura-
tions, or intervals of time, are fundamental, may be called durationism, and can be 
traced back to Aristotle’s conception of the continuum (Physics, 6). This, I shall also 
argue, indeed constitutes a hurdle for presentism.
I shall proceed as follows. In §2 I shall briefly review the main different the-
oretical options regarding the nature of times, i.e., instants and intervals, and the mi-
cro-structure of time, how times are connected. In §3, I shall briefly review the main 
standpoints in temporal ontology and introduce substantival presentism. In §4, I shall 
explain why this view is well equipped to deal with the challenges posed by the above 
quotation. In §5, we shall see that, if we look at events from the point of view of in-
stantism, substantival presentism can deal with them. However, if we look at them 
from the point of view of durationism, a presentist account is more problematic. This, 






























































shall conclude, in §6, with some ruminations on which version of onstantism may be 
better for the presentist.
II. Times and the Micro-structure of Time
Are there times? Although some philosophers endorse or at least take as a serious 
option eliminativism about times (Chisholm 1990; Hestevold 2008), this option is 
most problematic. It is hard to deny that we succeed in referring to something with 
dates, e.g., “April 11, 2020, 2.30 p.m. Greenwich time.” Dates are not empty terms 
like “the winged horse” or “the round square,” and what do we refer to with dates if 
not to times? Let us assume then that there are times and that they are the referents 
of dates. Times may be either intervals, e.g., the hour going from today’s noon sharp 
to today’s 1 p.m. sharp, or the instant of the beginning of this interval, today’s noon 
sharp. Such items are what we are discussing about in considering Instantism and 
Durationism, but before turning to that, let us briefly consider the options regarding 
the nature of times.
What are times? There is a primitivist option and various reductionist op-
tions, not all of which are equally open to the different ontological views to be reviewed 
below. The primitivist option is substantivalism (about time; there is an analogous 
doctrine about space (Dainton 2010, 2)), according to which times are sui generis 
entities (with instants or durations as more fundamental, depending on whether in-
stantism or durationism is accepted), and the occurrence of events at them is a prim-
itive and unanalyzable relation. As regards reductionism, let us first consider rela-
tionism (about time; there is an analogous doctrine about space (Dainton 2010, 2)), 
according to which times are reduced to events. A time is either a complete class of 
simultaneous events (Russell 1914; Whitehead 1929) or a complete mereological sum 
of simultaneous events (Pianesi & Varzi 1996), where completeness must be under-
stood as no lack of any event simultaneous with some event comprised in the class 
or sum in question. Given this line, occurring at a time is being a member of a certain 
set, or being a part of a certain whole. An alternative reductionist option, proposed by 
Prior (Prior 1968, ch. 11), is to view times as world propositions, which represent in 
all details how the world may be at an instant; the world proposition true now is the 
present instant, while world propositions that were true count as past instants, and 
propositions that will be true count as future instants. In this account, to occur at a 
time is for a proposition to be entailed by a certain world proposition; for example, 
that the death of Caesar occurred at a certain time means that the world proposition 
that were true when Caesar died entails the proposition ‹Caesar dies›.
Let us go back to instantism and durationism. According to the former, du-
rationless or point-like instants are fundamental and any duration (interval, exten-
sion, or stretch of time) is somehow made up of them. According to the latter, dura-
tions are fundamental, and any duration is infinitely divisible into smaller and smaller 
intervals, without ever reaching durationless instants, which exist, at best, as deriva-
tive entities; i.e., to use a now-fashionable terminology, time is gunky, and the inter-
vals that compose it are gunks.
We can further distinguish three alternative roads within Instantism. 
Instant-discretism holds that time is discrete, i.e., it has the structure of the set of 
(negative and) positive integers. Instant-densitism holds that time is dense, i.e., it has 
the structure of the (negative and) positive rational numbers. Instant-continuism 
holds that time is continuous, i.e., it has the structure of the (negative and) posi-






























































beginning). In instant-discretism, any instant has an immediate successor. In con-
trast, in both instant-densitism and instant-continuism, no instant has an immediate 
successor, for in between any two instants there are infinitely many other instants; 
denumerably or undenumerably many, depending on the former or the latter option, 
respectively.
Instant-continuism amounts to the Cantorean conception of the mi-
cro-structure of time, mentioned in the quotation from the Call for papers in the 
introduction. This arguably constitutes the standard view nowadays (Dainton 2010, 
301), capable of answering Zeno’s paradoxes (Grünbaum 1968). However, duration-
ism, or more generally the Aristotelian conception of the continuum, has had its own 
notable supporters, including Peirce and Whitehead, and recently has seen something 
like a revival (see Dainton 2010, § 17.7, for references).
III. Temporal Ontologies
We traditionally distinguish between A- and B-theories of time (see, e.g., Loux 2006 
for a survey and references to supporters of such views). According to the for-
mer approach, there are in a most fundamental sense objectively exemplified prop-
erties such as pastness, presentness and futurity. Such properties are taken to ac-
count for time passage understood as the becoming present of some temporal items 
that were previously future, while some other temporal items that were previously 
present become past. These temporal items may be times, events, or even proposi-
tions, as we shall see. As so understood, pastness, presentness and futurity are called 
A-properties, and are taken to be more fundamental than B-relations such as being 
earlier or simultaneous. These are typically considered, to the extent that they are 
admitted, somehow reducible to A-properties. According to the latter approach, in 
contrast, B-relations are most fundamental and are objectively exemplified by times 
or events, which are past, present or future only in a subjective sense, dependent on 
their being ordered by B-relations. Thus, there is no time passage understood in terms 
of A-properties.
According to A-eternalism, what is often called the spotlight view of time, 
past, present and future are equally real, they all exist. Thus, pastness, presentness 
and futurity objectively accrue to both events and times. For example, there are the 
events of Socrates’ drinking the hemlock, of my pressing the K key on my laptop and 
of (let us suppose) the first human landing on Mars. The first of them objectively ex-
emplifies pastness, the second presentness and the third futurity. Furthermore, there 
are the times at which such events take place, which also exemplify pastness, pre-
sentness and futurity, respectively. Finally, even the objects involved in such events, 
Socrates, the cup with the hemlock, myself, my laptop, the human landing on Mars, all 
exemplify pastness, presentness or futurity. All the entities that exemplify such prop-
erties also exemplify B-relations at best in a derivative sense. For example, Socrates’s 
drinking the hemlock is earlier than the human landing on Mars inasmuch as the for-
mer event is past and the latter is future.
According to another A-theoretical approach, pastism, or the growing 
block theory, only past and present exist, and the future is not real. Thus, going back 
to the previous examples, there exist Socrates’ drinking the hemlock, my pressing 
the K key on my laptop, the objects involved in such events, and the times of such 
events, exemplifying pastness and presentness, as the case may be. Futurity may at 
most be attributed to propositions, to the extent that they will be true; for example, 






























































the corresponding present-tensed proposition “a human is landing on Mars” will be 
true, and can thus be said to exemplify futurity. Consequently, the former proposi-
tion could be said, in a sense, to be earlier than the latter (it may be worth noting that 
when the present-tensed proposition “a human is landing on Mars” will be true, it will 
no longer exemplify futurity, but rather presentness).
A further sort of A-theory is presentism, or, let me say, standard presentism, 
as I will distinguish in a while different types of Presentism. Standard Presentism 
holds that only what is present exist. Hence, still relying on the previous examples, 
only my pressing the K key on my laptop, the objects involved in it and the time of its 
occurrence exist, and they all enjoy presentness. Pastness and futurity may at most 
be attributed to propositions, to the extent that they were or will be true; for exam-
ple, the past-tensed proposition <Socrates drank the hemlock> is true, and accord-
ingly the corresponding past-tensed proposition < Socrates is drinking the hemlock > 
will be true, and can thus be said to exemplify pastness. Again, the former proposition 
could then be said, in a sense, to be earlier than the latter.
In the B-theoretical camp, we shall mention just B-eternalism, typically sim-
ply called the B-theory (though there are many variants, as we turn to fine-grained 
ontological details, which need not detain us here). According to this approach, past, 
present and future are also real, but in a different sense: events and times are objec-
tively arranged in terms of being earlier or simultaneous, and, on the basis of this, 
they are past, present or future, but only in a subjective sense pretty much as things 
are spatially here, near or far in relation to a given subject. For example, Socrates’s 
drinking the hemlock is past in that it is earlier than my tokening this sentence, which 
is simultaneous with my pressing the K key on my laptop, and earlier than the first 
human landing on Mars; which makes the latter two events, present and future, re-
spectively. In a similar way, the times at which such events occur and thus the objects 
involved in them are also past, present, or future.
This brief survey should make it evident that, whereas both A- and 
B-eternalists could accept a reduction of times to events, this option is not open to 
Pastism and Presentism, for the former lack future events and thus cannot construct 
future times, and the latter also lack past events, and thus cannot construct past 
times as well. Thus, presentists, following the lead of Prior, have typically resorted to a 
reduction of times to world propositions. Once times are so viewed, even the presen-
tist can say that there are past and future times. There is however a widespread opin-
ion that times are somehow presupposed in this approach, so that it cannot be en-
dorsed without circularity (see, e.g., Newton-Smith 1980, ch. 6, §6; Meyer, 2013, ch.9). 
Be this as it may, there are a number of other difficulties with this proposal or at least 
advantages for the substantivalist option. First, we may note a problem shared with 
the reduction of times to events, namely that the possibility of time passage without 
change can hardly be accounted for (Newton-Smith 1980, ch. 6, §6). If there were a 
period of time without change, i.e. a sequence of times with the very same events 
occurring at all the times in the sequence, only one world proposition could be true 
for the whole period, which would mean, given the identification of times with world 
propositions, that there would be a single instant, rather than, contrary to the sup-
position, a sequence of distinct times. Yet, a changeless period of time seems possible, 
and in certain peculiar imaginary circumstances even inferable (Shoemaker 1969). 
Second, it has been claimed that presentism is in trouble in accounting for the direc-
tion of time, because it cannot rely on the being earlier relation freely available to the 
B-theorist (Oaklander, 2002; 2003). Given substantivalism, however, times must be 






























































another in the order provided by the relation. Third, a reduction of times to proposi-
tions is hardly lined up with commonsense (Hinchcliff, 1996,  124), the preservation 
of which is typically taken to be a presentist asset.
In Orilia 2012, I have proposed that, in order to circumvent these difficulties, 
the presentist could subscribe to a substantivalist approach to time and thus accept 
times as primitive irreducible entities. Moreover, I have also proposed therein that, in 
order to tackle many other well-known challenges that Presentism must confront, 
the presentist could also accept the “ex-concrete objects” endorsed in Williamson’s 
(2002, 2013) permanentism. According to it, as Williamson puts it (2013, 4), “always 
everything is always something;” thus, for example, Socrates still presently exists, 
though it is no longer a concrete object, as he used to be, and he is rather ex-concrete. 
Presentism with substantival times and ex-concrete objects, which I have called mo-
derate presentism, is elaborated and defended in Orilia 2016. However, the reasons 
that motivate that endorsement of ex-concrete objects need not detain us here and 
we can concentrate for our purposes on substantival presentism, i.e., a presentism 
that simply incorporates substantival times and leaves it open whether or not there 
are ex-concrete objects.
According to substantival presentism, all times, understood as sui generis 
primitive entities, always exist, always permanently ordered by the being earlier re-
lation, though only the present time is such that events occur at it. That is, we may 
say, only the present time is filled with events and thus with the objects involved in 
such events. The other times exist, but are, we may also say, empty. Such times are 
past or future, as the case may be, in that events occurred at them before the pres-
ent time became present, or will occur at them when the present time will no longer 
be present. But they are not merely past or future, since they also exist at the present 
time just as much as the present time, though with no events occurring at them. For 
it is at the present time that there occur all the permanent facts of the sort time t1 is 
earlier than time t2. A comparison may be useful. The sun is a present entity that is 
involved in events that occur at the present time, but it is also a past and future en-
tity in that there were events that occurred at earlier times and events that will oc-
cur at later times, involving the sun; so that the sun also existed at those earlier times, 
and will exist at those later times. In other words, the sun is a past and future entity, 
besides being a present entity, but it is not a merely past or future entity. Following 
McTaggart, we are used to think that past, present and future are incompatible de-
terminations. This is fine if by past and future we mean merely past and merely fu-
ture. However, of an entity that endures through time we can say that it existed, ex-
ists now, and will exist, and thus that it is past (existed at a past time), and it is future 
(will exist at a future time), while adding that it is not merely past or future, since it 
is also present (exists at the present time). This is what we think of the sun. The idea 
is to view the times that are earlier and later than the present time in the same fash-
ion. It may be worth noting that the fact that all times exist at the present time is per-
fectly compatible with the present time’s being a durationless instant. For the exist-
ence of the times at the present time is simply due to the occurrence at the present 
time of all the facts of the sort time t1 is earlier than time t2. As constituents of such 
facts, which occur at the present time, all times occur at the present time, and this is 
perfectly compatible with the present time being an instant.
Of course, which time is the present time keeps changing, and here the dy-
namical A-theoretical aspect that we expect in any form of presentism enters the 
picture. Thus, one time after the other becomes present, thus ceasing to be emp-






























































suppose, John’s kissing Mary, John and Mary, as well as the peculiar events, if we may 
call them so, which are the facts of the sort time t1 is earlier than time t2, and the 
times which are constituents of such facts. And correspondingly, one time after the 
other ceases to be present, thereby becoming empty. (Somewhat analogous views, 
although framed in terms of spacetime, rather than simply time, are defended by 
Zimmerman 2011 and Sullivan 2012).
IV. Instantism from the Perspective of Substantival Presentism
Let us now reconsider in detail the passage of the Philosophy Kitchen call for papers 
quoted in the introduction, with the goal of then evaluating it from the point of view 
of substantival Presentism. This passage raises the following difficulty for presentism: 
instant-continuism appears to presuppose eternalism, since it appears to presup-
pose that there are, tenselessly speaking, undenumerably many instants, only one 
of which, at most, can be present. Hence, instant-continuism appears to entail that 
there are some non-present entities, and thus it appears to be incompatible with pre-
sentism. Moreover, the passage raises a problem for A-theories in general, and thus 
implicitly a further difficulty for presentism: The undenumerable series of instants 
presupposed by instant-continuism is ordered by the B-theoretic being earlier rela-
tion, and thus this relation seems to be given ontological priority over A-properties. 
However, A-properties are taken to be fundamental in an A-theory, as they are taken 
to account for time passage, understood as losing futurity and acquiring presentness 
and then pastness.
It should be noted that these two issues could be raised in precisely the 
same manner from the point of view of instant-densitism and instant-discretism. 
All that really matters is the assumption of a series of instants arranged by the be-
ing earlier relation, independently of whether this series is continuous, in which case 
the instants are undenumerably many, or rather dense or discrete, in which case the 
instants are denumerably or countably many. Hence, the answers that substantival 
presentism can offer are equally valid, regardless of which version of instantism is as-
sumed. Let us turn to such answers.
The first difficulty can be immediately disposed of in the light of the preced-
ing section. Substantival presentism makes room for the series of instants presup-
posed by instantism. However, it takes all these instants to exist at the present in-
stant, qua constituents of B-relational facts of the form t is earlier than t’, which are 
taken to occur at the present time. In so doing it remains a form of presentism.
As regards the second difficulty, the problem here is whether there is still 
room for time passage in terms of A-properties, once a most fundamental being ear-
lier relation that arranges instants has been acknowledged. Now, given substanti-
val presentism there clearly is such room. For this approach does not view the pre-
sentness of an instant subjectively in terms of simultaneity, as in the B-theory, but 
in terms of its objectively having events occurring at it. Since the instant that exem-
plifies such presentness keeps changing, and correspondingly futurity and pastness 
are lost and acquired by other instants, there is A-theoretical passage. The dynamic 
aspect of time is captured by the fact that instants, one after the other, as they be-
come present, are filled with events, while all the other events are empty: only present 
events exist, thereby constituting total present reality, or the present total state of af-
fairs, we may say. This is so, even though there is an irreducible being earlier B-relation 
permanently arranging the instants. Its presence in no way hinders the fundamen-






























































passage, in the sense that which instants become present, after the present instant 
ceases to be present, depends on which instants are earlier and which are later than 
the present instant. That is, if t1 is present and t0 and t2 are, respectively, earlier and 
later than t1, it is t2 that will become present, whereas t0 will always remain past.
V. Dynamic Events
In Casati’s and Varzi’s (2015) terminology, events can be subdivided into static and 
dynamic. The former do not involve change and are perhaps more appropriately 
called states (of affairs). The latter in contrast typically involve change and are more 
usually called events. As an example of the former we could consider a snapshot of a 
ball sitting still at a certain specific place. By presupposing instantism we may say that 
this state occurs at a certain instant; the durationist may say something similar after 
reconstructing instants in terms of intervals. As an example of the latter, we could 
consider a ball rapidly moving from a place to another. Intuitively, this movement oc-
cupies an interval of time.
Dynamic events pose a problem for presentism. We observe them, they can 
occupy our specious present, and thus their existence can hardly be denied. And yet, 
once we admit this, it seems that we must also admit past events, in contrast with pre-
sentism. Suppose for example that August now sees a ball running from p1 to p4 in the 
interval from t1 to t4. Thus August sees a certain dynamic event; call it ED. The per-
ception is veridical, let us assume, and thus ED presently exists. However, ED is made 
up, one could say, of static events following one another, e.g., event e1 consisting of the 
ball’s being in p1, then event e2 consisting of the ball’s being in p2, then event e3 con-
sisting of the ball’s being in p3 and finally event e4 consisting of the ball’s being in p4. 
And thus we should admit that there are events, such as p1, p2, and p3, that are earlier 
than other events. By being earlier than other events, these events can hardly be con-
sidered present. They must be past, one could urge. Moreover, there is a conscious state 
of mind of August’s, which lasts from t1 to t4, his specious present, which, one could 
suspect, involves conscious states some of which are earlier than others and must then 
be past, e.g., the vision of e2 and the vision of e3. Hence, there exist past events, both 
physical and mental, and presentism, one could then suspect, is false (Orilia 2012a).
What can the presentist reply? The problem is due to the fact that the dy-
namic event is taken to really occur at an extended interval of time, and once this is 
admitted it seems it can be subdivided into slices, some of which must be past. And 
if we accept durations as primitive and fundamental, it seems we are forced to view 
things precisely in this way. To be sure, a certain interval can be taken to be present. 
This is the choice proposed by Hestevold (2008), who calls such an extended pres-
ent a “thick” present, and thu speaks of “Thick Presentism”.” The opposite choice is, in 
his terminology, “Thin Presentism”, according to which the present is «thin», that is 
instantaneous or durationless. Hestevold argues that the duration of the thick pres-
ent that presentists should allow for had better be that of “an ‘extraordinarily brief’ 
event; e.g. a butterfly’s flapping its wings exactly twice” (Hestevold 2008, 334). For 
otherwise presentists would be committed to a host of past objects that they do not 
want to acknowledge. But even with such brief presents, there would be past objects 
that the presentist should not acknowledge, even simply the butterfly’s first flapping 
of its wing within one thick present, when the second flapping is taking place. And 
moreover, what would precisely determine the length of the present? Why not that 
of a faster movement, occupying simply the time of the second flapping of wings, or 






























































presentist is better off without having to answer these questions and without past 
events as subparts of events that occur at an interval. That is, the presentist had bet-
ter take the present to be a durationless instant, at which events occur, and in fact I 
think presentists typically take the present in this way. And thus instantism rather 
than durationism seems to be a better choice for the presentist.
But then how should the presentist account for dynamic events? With the 
resources offered by substantival presentism, i.e., with instants as primitive entities 
and the appeal to tense granted by an A-theory, it can be done as follows. First of all, 
one could accept past-tensed and future-tensed properties of the sort having been 
F at instant t or being potentially F at time t. One could then reconstruct a dynamic 
event as an event that occurs at an instant, but involves the exemplification of such 
past-tensed properties. To illustrate, consider again the ball moving from p1 to p4 in 
the interval from t1 to t4. At time t3 there occurs a static event which is the ball’s be-
ing at p3, but there also occur events involving past-tensed and future-tensed prop-
erties such as those consisting of the ball’s exemplifying the following properties: 
having been in p1 at t1, having been in p2 at t2, being potentially in p4 at t4. By vir-
tue of this, we may say, there also occur at t3 the dynamic event which is the ball’s 
moving from p1 to p4. There are dynamic events, in other words, insofar as there are 
objects having such past-tensed and future-tensed properties, in addition to pres-
ent-tensed properties.
A natural further step is to associate this approach to a Husserlian reten-
tional model of the specious present, which certainly is presentist-friendly, in con-
trast with other models of the specious present (see Dainton 2018). According to it, 
the specious present involves retentions, impressions and protentions. The idea here 
is that these three items represent exemplifications of past-tensed, present-tensed, 
and future-tensed properties, respectively. Thus, in perceiving the dynamic event 
consisting of the ball’s moving, August has at t3 an instantaneous conscious state 
with retentions, impressions and protentions within it, so that the perception of a 
succession is not a succession of perceptions but one perception with a “before” (re-
tentions), a “now” (impressions) and an “after” (protentions) within it: retentions cor-
responding to the events consisting of the ball’s having been in p1 at t1 and having 
been in p2 at t2; an impression corresponding to the event consisting of the ball’s be-
ing in p3; a protention corresponding to the event of the ball’s potentially being in p4 
at t4 (see Orilia 2012, for further details).
VI. Concluding Remarks
In sum, the presentist has no problems with instantism, at least after accepting the 
substantivalist option. By endording it, the presentist can also nicely account for dy-
namic events. And, on the other hand, dynamic events suggest that the presentist 
had better avoid durationism. But is instant-continuism really the best choice for the 
presentist (or more generally for whoever embraces instantism)?
The problem is that, despite our Cantorean wisdom, a continuous, or even 
simply dense, progression in time remains baffling for Zenonian reasons, with “a puz-
zling character ... [that] may be ineliminable” (Dantoin 2010, 284). The specifically 
temporal aspect of the perplexity is well explained by Findlay (1941, p. 156; insertions 
into brackets are mine):
[W]hen we strip Zeno’s problem of its spatial and other wrappings, its significance becomes 






























































therefore foolish to think that we can meet Zeno’s puzzles by the modern theory of the con-
tinuum or by the facts of infinite convergent numerical series ... And the problem assumes its 
most vexing form if we allow that ordinary happenings have ultimate parts that take no time 
[in my terminology, static events occupying durationless instants]. For of such parts it seems 
most natural to say [given Instant-Densitism or –Continuism] that none can be next to any 
other, and once this is said it is hard to understand how any ultimate part can ever pass away 
or be replaced by any other. For before such part can be replaced by any other similar part, it 
must have first been replaced by an infinity of other similar parts. Our admission seems to 
leave us with a world immobilized and paralyzed, in which every object and process, like the 
arrow of Zeno, stands still in the instant, for the simple reason that it has no way of passing 
on to other instants.
Thus, perhaps, one may be tempted to say that one should favour instant-discre-
tism, which grants that any instant has a next instant. After all, it is more digestible 
for common sense, which the presentist is supposed to honour.On the other hand, 
the math used in modern physics seems to presuppose continuity. To see it, it is suf-
ficient to notice this: if a physical square has a 1 meter long side, we must say that its 
diagonal is √2 meter long. Consider then a body moving at the uniform speed of 1 
meter per second. It will take, it seems we should say, seconds to move along the di-
agonal. The example suggests that we need reals to measure time, which in turn sug-
gests that time is continuous (Salmon 1970, 35). And fortunately, after setting aside 
Findlay’s perplexity, Zeno’s arguments against continuity (the Achilles, Dichotomy, 
and Plurality paradoxes) can be answered by the Cantorean conception of continui-
ty (See Grünbaum 1968, Salmon 1970). Finally, Zeno does not only have arguments 
against continuity. Its Stadium paradox can be viewed as a nasty argument against 
discreteness (Salmon 1970).
There are possible replies to these arguments in favour of continuity, 
though. Modern physics could be done with discrete math after all: the experts tell 
us that there are systems of discrete mathematics that could be employed, and that 
we could in principle view the use of reals as an approximation of what we should 
really do (Caratheodory 1963; Penrose 2004, ch. 16). And the Stadium can some-
how be digested by the Instant-Discretist (Dainton, 2010, 296). Finally, one could add, 
Quantum Mechanics may be taken to suggest discrete time (Dainton, 2010, 299). In 
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